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CTPS has conducted a fare increase impacts analysis to assist MBTA staff and the 
MBTA Board of Directors in determining the impacts of the proposed 2007 fare increase 
and restructuring on the following: revenue, ridership, air quality, and environmental 
justice.  The analysis will also assist the MBTA in determining the impacts of potential 
service reductions in lieu of a fare increase. 
 
CTPS used two models to project ridership and revenue impacts of the fare increase and 
restructuring.  The regional travel demand model uses the traditional four-step process to 
describe regional travel patterns and can be used to model the impacts of various changes 
in service or price on these patterns and their effect on ridership and revenue.  A 
spreadsheet model was developed by CTPS specifically for the fare restructuring effort 
and presents a second method for modeling ridership and revenue impacts.  The two 
models predict relatively similar changes in revenue and ridership, both in absolute and 
percentage terms.  The predicted percentage increase in revenue was 18.4% by the travel 
demand model and 21.2% by the spreadsheet model.  The predicted decrease in ridership 
was 2.8% by the travel demand model and 6.1% by the spreadsheet model. 
 
The regional travel demand model was also used to estimate the air quality impacts of the 
proposed fare increase and restructuring.  According to the model, very little impact on 
air pollution is expected as a result of the changes.  The projected increase in the 
estimated levels of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds is, 
in each case, below 0.3%. 
 
Based on the results of the travel demand model, CTPS was able to analyze the equity 
implications of the proposed fare increase and restructuring on minority and low-income 
communities.  The findings indicate that the proposed fare structure and fare levels, as 
well as the current structure and prices, do not place a disproportionate burden on 
environmental justice communities.  Indeed, low-income and minority communities pay 
lower average fares than the systemwide average.  In moving from the existing to the 
proposed fare structure, however, the difference between the monetary increase in 
average fares paid in environmental justice communities and the systemwide average 
price increase is very small, resulting in percentage increases in price that are slightly 
higher in environmental justice communities.  In effect, since environmental justice 
communities already experience lower average fares than the systemwide average, 
absolute changes of relatively equal magnitude will have a greater percentage impact on 
those specific communities. 
 
Finally, in case the 2007 fare increase and consequent gain in operating revenue does not 
occur, MBTA Service Planning prepared a list of service reductions that would save a 
substantial portion of annual operating expenses.  These reductions targeted some of the 
highest net-cost-per-passenger bus routes as well as weekend and weekday evening 
subway and commuter rail service, along with cuts to other programs and services.  The 
reductions, while aimed at avoiding a substantial degradation in regional transit mobility, 






During the period since the last fare increase in early 2004, the MBTA has devoted 
considerable time to evaluating the revenue and ridership impacts of potential substantial 
changes to its fare structure.  These changes are meant to take advantage of the 
flexibilities in pricing and payment options afforded by the new automated fare collection 
system.  In cooperation with its Rider Oversight Committee, the MBTA arrived at a final 
proposal for this new fare structure that provides for reduced-rate intermodal transfers 
and incentives for smart card use, among other features.  These changes have been 
included as part of a fare increase and restructuring proposed for early 2007. 
 
CTPS has been asked to provide technical assistance in projecting the impacts of such a 
potential fare increase and restructuring, as it did in 1991, 2000, and 2004.  For the 2004 
fare increase, CTPS produced a report that included projections of revenue, ridership, 
environmental, and socioeconomic impacts, along with the impacts of alternative service 
reductions that would have been necessary if the fare increase was not implemented.  The 
analyses in this report address the same issues for the 2007 proposal, utilizing the Boston 
Region Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) regional travel demand model, along 
with a spreadsheet estimation model for revenue and ridership impacts that was 
developed specifically for fare-change proposals like this one.  
 
 
THE PROPOSED FARE STRUCTURE: DESCRIPTION AND RATIONALE 
 
The Rider Oversight Committee was established in response to the previous MBTA fare 
increase in 2004 to better incorporate the public and advocacy voices into the planning 
process.  At its inception, the Committee was specifically charged with reviewing the 
existing fare structure and, should it have any suggestions for change, discussing those 
suggestions with the MBTA.  Most of the structural features described in this report are 
the result of this process. 
 
The principal characteristics of the proposed fare structure are as follows: 
• Flat fares by mode for all local bus and rapid transit trips and a reduction of 
express bus fare zones to two; 
• A “step-up” transfer privilege between local bus, rapid transit, and express bus 
whereby the transfer price equals the “step-up,” or difference, in price from a 
lower-priced mode to a higher-priced mode, such that the customer never pays 
any more than the single flat fare for that higher-priced mode; 
• The merging of the subway-only and combo pass categories; and 
• Single-ride fare surcharges ranging from 18% to over 100% on trips not made 
with the new CharlieCard technology. 
 
There are several reasons for why the Rider Oversight Committee and the MBTA 
decided on these changes to the fare structure.  The new flat-fare-by-mode with simple 
“step-up” transfer privileges between local bus, rapid transit, and express bus responds to 
the MBTA’s enabling legislation to provide for free or substantially reduced-rate bus-rail 
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transfers on the system.  Indeed, by instituting the “step-up” transfer, the MBTA can 
ensure that basic transit mobility for those living beyond a walking distance of a rapid 
transit line remains in fiscal reach of those with the least economic means.  Where 
currently a local bus-rapid transit transfer trip would generally cost $2.15 (and even more 
if the trip was made on a zoned-local bus or through an extra-fare station on the rapid 
transit system), the new maximum fare would actually decrease to $1.70.  This logic also 
applies to the merging of the subway-only and combo pass categories.  Whereas the 
current combo pass price is $71.00, the new merged pass price will be $59.00. 
 
There is a compelling business interest in implementing this major fare restructuring 
requested by the Rider Oversight Committee at the same time as the institution of a new 
automated fare collection (AFC) system.  The restructuring eliminates more than a dozen 
anomalies in the fare structure that are the product of various political and operating 
considerations over the years – many of which have little ongoing justification.  It is 
expected that these changes will contribute to increased ridership among potential 
customers currently unfamiliar with the transit system who may be intimidated by the 
complicated fare structure.  The installation of AFC equipment also permits the adoption 
of the “step-up” transfer privilege.  As mentioned, this will lower the cost of bus-rapid 
transit transfer trips and thus encourage more customers to make better use of the entire 
MBTA system.  Finally, in the interest of encouraging customers to use the CharlieCard, 
which is the most efficient mode of payment using AFC, the MBTA is assessing a 
surcharge on all single-ride trips that are not made using this fare payment mechanism.  
In addition, the step-up transfer privilege will only be offered to CharlieCard customers. 
 
The proposed fare structure mirrors the most commonly used approach to pricing among 
peer transit agencies throughout North America.  In particular, a single price is set for 
travel throughout an urban core on local bus and rapid transit, and rapid transit time-
based pass holders receive unlimited rides on local buses as well.  This approach 
acknowledges that, within the rapid transit and local bus service area, customers value 
transit service based on whether it gets them to their destination safely and efficiently – 
not based on the distance they travel or the transfers they make.  This approach to value 




ESTIMATION METHODS USED 
 
Two separate approaches were used by CTPS in attempting to project the impact on 
MBTA ridership and revenue.  The first approach consisted of applying the Boston 
Region MPO’s regional travel demand model to forecast demand for each MBTA mode 
with the present and increased fare levels.  The second approach used a set of 
spreadsheets originally created by CTPS and the MBTA to project impacts.  In the past, 
CTPS had used solely a spreadsheet-based approach to compute ridership and revenue 
impacts.  The regional travel demand model was employed in this fare impacts analysis 
to complement the spreadsheet model, with the two models together providing some 
indication of the potential range of impacts that could be expected.  The regional travel 
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demand model, as in previous analyses, was used to conduct the air quality and 
environmental justice impact analyses. 
 
Travel Demand Model Approach 
 
The regional travel demand model used by CTPS simulates travel on the entire eastern 
Massachusetts transit and highway systems.  As such, it contains all MBTA rail and bus 
lines and all private express bus lines.  The regional travel demand model contains 
service frequency (i.e., how often trains and buses arrive at a given transit stop), routing, 
travel time, and fares for all these lines.  In the highway system, all express highways, 
principal arterial roadways, and many minor arterial and local roadways are included.   
 
The travel demand forecasting procedure used in this analysis is based on a traditional 
four-step, sequential process: trip generation, trip distribution, mode choice, and trip 
assignment.  This process is used to estimate average daily transit ridership, primarily on 
the basis of estimates of population and employment, projected highway travel conditions 
(including downtown parking costs), and projected transit service to be provided.  
 
The entire eastern Massachusetts geographic area represented in the regional travel 
demand model is divided into several hundred smaller areas known as traffic analysis 
zones (TAZs).  This model set employs sophisticated and complex techniques in each of 
the four steps of the process.  The following paragraphs describe very briefly what each 
step does.  
 
Trip Generation  
 
In this step, the regional travel demand model estimates the number of trips produced in 
and attracted to each traffic zone.  To do this, the regional travel demand model uses 
estimates of population, employment, and other socioeconomic and household 




In the trip distribution step, the regional travel demand model links the trip ends 
estimated in the trip generation step to form zonal trip interchanges or movements 
between two zones.  The output of this second step of the four-step process is a trip table, 
which is a matrix containing the number of trips occurring between every origin-




The mode choice step allocates the person trips estimated from the trip distribution step 
to the two primary competing modes, automobile and transit.  This allocation is based on 
the desirability or utility of each choice a traveler faces, based on the attributes of that 
choice and the characteristics of the individual.  The resulting output of the mode choice 
step is the percentage of trips that use automobiles and the percentage that use transit for 





In this final step, the regional travel demand model assigns the transit trips to different 
transit modes such as subway, commuter rail, local bus, or express bus.  To do this, it 
uses multiple transit paths from one zone to another that minimize generalized cost.  
These paths may involve just one mode, such as a local bus or commuter rail, or multiple 
modes, such as a local bus and a transfer to the subway.  The highway trips are assigned 
to the highway network.  Thus, the traffic volumes on the highways and transit ridership 
on different transit lines can be obtained from the regional travel demand model outputs. 
 
Population and employment data are key inputs to the demand forecasting process.  The 
data used here were obtained from the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC).  
The highway travel times used in the analysis are those used in other recent CTPS transit 
and highway studies.  Downtown parking costs are also those used in other recent 
studies.  The regional travel demand model assumes that, in general, people wish to 
minimize transfers.  They may also wish to minimize travel time, even if it costs more. 
 
Spreadsheet Model Approach 
 
The spreadsheet tools used to estimate revenue and ridership impacts of the proposed 
2007 fare increase and restructuring were considerably updated from those used for the 
2004 fare increase.  The new spreadsheet model reflects many more of the fare 
complexities in the MBTA system and incorporates the ability to analyze several 
structural changes to MBTA pricing, many of which are included as part of the 2007 fare 
increase. 
 
Inputs to these spreadsheets call for ridership to be broken down not only by mode and 
fare-payment method, but also by subcategories such as passengers making combination 
bus and rapid transit trips.  These subcategories represent a finer level of detail than was 
pursued in recent MBTA fare-mix studies,1 so in some cases it was necessary to make 
assumptions about the proportions of passengers paying full or reduced cash fares or with 
passes.  In addition, some multimodal trips do not fit into any of the categories included 
in the spreadsheet.  For example, although there are categories for trips using 
combinations of local bus and rapid transit, there are none for express bus combined with 
rapid transit or for local bus combined with surface Green Line.  Survey results show that 
such trips do take place, albeit in fairly small numbers.  Time constraints did not allow 
for modification of the spreadsheets to provide for additional categories.  Therefore, 
ridership for such trips was generally combined with ridership in similar categories. 
 
                                     
1 MBTA fare-mix studies are conducted periodically as a means of determining the proportion, or “mix,” 
of passengers using various forms of fare payment.  With this information, the average fare per passenger 




Fares are one of many factors that influence the level of ridership on transit services.  
Price elasticity is the measure of either the expected or observed rate of change in 
ridership relative to a change in fares if all other factors remain constant.  On a traditional 
demand curve that describes the relationship between price, on the y-axis, and demand, 
on the x-axis, elasticities are equivalent to the slope along that curve.  As such, price 
elasticities are generally expected to be negative, meaning that a positive price increase 
will lead to a decrease in demand (with a price decrease having the opposite effect).  As 
the absolute value of the price elasticity increases, the projected impact on demand also 
grows.  Larger (or more negative) price elasticities are said to be relatively “elastic,” 
while smaller negative values closer to zero are said to be relatively “inelastic.”  Thus, if 
the price elasticity of the demand for transit is assumed to be elastic, a given fare increase 
would cause a greater loss of ridership than if demand were assumed to be inelastic. 
 
At its most elemental level, the spreadsheet model is based on this simple price elasticity 
relationship, and requires four inputs: original demand, original fare, new fare, and the 
price elasticity.  The formula for calculating new demand is the following: 
 
 New Demand = Original Demand ×  [(New Fare / Original Fare)(Price Elasticity)] 
 
Note that this formula uses a point elasticity to project the change in demand due to a 
change in price; the spreadsheet model also offers the ability to calculate demand using 
arc elasticities.2  The decision was made to use point elasticities in this application in 
order to provide consistency with the demand forecasting methodology used in the 
regional travel demand model. 
 
As an example, assume that original ridership equals 100 and that the impact that is being 
modeled is a 10% fare increase from $1.00 to $1.10.  Also assume that the price elasticity 
is -0.25. 
 
 New Demand = 100 ×  [($1.10 / $1.00)(-0.25)] = 97.65 
 
Thus, a simple price elasticity model using an elasticity of -0.25 projects that a 10% 
increase in price will lead to a 2.35% decrease in demand.  With the fare increased from 
$1.00 to $1.10, this simplified model projects a 7.42% increase in revenue ($100.00 to 
$107.42). 
 
                                     
2 Point and arc elasticities are two different methods of measuring the impact on demand of price changes.  
Arc elasticities measure the slope on the demand curve between two points (generally the x-intercept and y-
intercept) and thus assume a constant slope/elasticity throughout the curve.  Point elasticities measure the 
slope on the demand curve at a single point, thus allowing for the possibility of different slopes along the 
curve, which is much more realistic.  The difficulty (and reason why many analyses use arc elasticities 




An additional complexity – providing increased accuracy – of the spreadsheet model 
occurs with the use of ridership diversion factors.  These factors reflect estimates of the 
likelihood of a switch in demand for one good to another that is related to the change in 
the relative prices of those goods.  As an example using price elasticities and diversion 
factors for cash and pass customers, assume that original ridership equals 100 cash riders 
and 1,000 pass riders.  Also assume that original prices for cash tickets and passes equal 
$2.00 and $100.00, respectively, and that the new prices are set at $1.50 for cash tickets 
and $50.00 for passes, representing price decreases of 25% and 50%.  Assume that the 
cash price elasticity equals -0.35 and the pass price elasticity equals -0.25.  Finally, 
assume a cash-to-pass diversion factor of 0.05 and a pass-to-cash diversion factor of 0.00.  
In these pairs of diversion factors, one of the factors must always equal zero, indicating 
that the diversion is expected to occur in one direction only.  The direction of the 
diversion, and thus the diversion factor values, depends on the categories’ respective 
price changes.  The category with the greater respective price decrease (or the smaller 
respective price increase), in this case, passes, where the price decrease is 50% compared 
to 25% for cash tickets, would gain riders from the diversion while the other category 
with the smaller respective price decrease (or the greater respective price increase) would 
lose riders from the diversion.  One would therefore expect that cash customers would 
switch to passes, but not that pass customers would switch to cash tickets (hence the 0.05 
cash-to-pass and 0.00 pass-to-cash diversion factors). 
 
The diversion factors essentially work to redistribute demand between the two categories 
after the respective price elasticities have been applied.  For instance, after the cash fare 
is decreased from $2.00 to $1.50, the projected effect of price elasticity is that cash 
demand grows to 111.  Similarly, the pass price decrease from $100 to $50 leads to a 
projected increase in pass demand, due to price elasticity, to 1,189, for a total ridership of 
1,300.  However, the percentage decrease in the pass price is larger than that for cash 
fares (50% versus 25%); thus, one would expect some customers to switch from cash to 
passes.  This diversion is estimated by taking the ratio of new-to-original cash prices 
($1.50 / $2.00, or 75%), dividing that ratio by the ratio of new-to-original pass prices 
($50 / $100, or 50%), subtracting 1, and multiplying this result by the 0.05 diversion 
factor and the price-elasticity-estimated cash ridership (111).  The number of riders 
“diverted” from cash to pass equals 3, giving final ridership estimates of 108 for cash and 
1,192 for passes, again summing to a total ridership of 1,300. 
 
 New Cash Demand (Price Effect), Cp = 100 ×  [($1.50 / $2.00)(-0.35)] = 111 
 New Pass Demand (Price Effect), Pp = 1,000 ×  [($50 / $100)(-0.25)] = 1,189 
 
 Total Demand = 111 + 1,189 = 1,300 
 

















00.2$/50.1$ = 3 
 
 New Cash Demand = Cp – Diverted Riders from Cash to Pass = 108 
 
 New Pass Demand = Pp + Diverted Riders from Cash to Pass = 1,192 
 
 Total Demand = 108 + 1,192 = 1,300 
 
These diversion rates are applied to specific pairs of categories, such as bus cash versus 
bus pass, bus cash versus subway cash, bus pass versus combo pass, etc.  The rates were 
determined based on similar estimates of diversion factors by the New York City Transit 
Authority (NYCTA) and, as was the case with the NYCTA analysis, they are fairly 
conservative, meaning that small estimated shifts from categories with larger percent 
price increases (or smaller percent price decreases) to categories with smaller percent 
price increases (or larger percent price decreases) are expected.  For example, a less-
conservative diversion rate of 0.15, compared to the 0.05 rate used above, would result in 
a shift of 9 passengers from cash to pass, compared to 3. 
 
Examples of Ridership and Revenue Calculations 
 
 Simple Example (Price Elasticity only) 
 
• Original Demand: 100,000 
• Original Fare: $1.50 
• New Fare: $2.50 
• Price Elasticity: -0.05 
 
New Demand = 100,000 ×  [($2.50 / $1.50)(-0.05)] = 97,478 
 
 More Complex Example (Price Elasticity plus Ridership Diversion – Cash-Pass) 
 
• Original Cash Demand: 10,000 
• Original Cash Fare: $2.25 
• New Cash Fare: $2.00 
• Cash Price Elasticity: -0.30 
 
New Cash Demand (Price Effect), Cp = 10,000 ×  [($2.00 / $2.25)(-0.3)] = 10,360 
 
• Original Pass Demand: 5,000 
• Original Pass Price: $71.00 
• New Pass Price: $50.00 
• Pass Price Elasticity: -0.25 
 
New Pass Demand (Price Effect), Pp = 5,000 ×  [($50 / $71)(-0.25)] = 5,458 
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Total Demand = 10,360 + 5,458 = 15,818 
 
• % Change in Cash Price: $2.25 to $2.00: -11% 
• % Change in Pass Price: $71 to $50: -30% 
• Cash-Pass Diversion Factor: 0.05 
• Pass-Cash Diversion Factor: 0.00 
 






25.2$/00.2$ = 136 
 
New Cash Demand = Cp – Diverted Riders from Cash to Pass = 10,224 
 
New Pass Demand = Pp + Diverted Riders from Cash to Pass = 5,594 
 
Total Demand = 10,224 + 5,594 = 15,818 
 
Additionally Complex Example (Price Elasticity plus two Ridership Diversions – 
Cash-Pass and Cash-Multiride) 
 
• Original Cash Demand: 10,000 
• Original Cash Fare: $2.20 
• New Cash Fare: $3.50 
• Cash Price Elasticity: -0.30 
 
New Cash Demand (Price Effect), Cp = 10,000 ×  [($3.50 / $2.20)(-0.3)] = 8,700 
 
• Original Pass Demand: 50,000 
• Original Pass Price: $71.00 
• New Pass Price: $90.00 
• Pass Price Elasticity: -0.25 
 
New Pass Demand (Price Effect), Pp = 50,000 ×  [($90 / $71)(-0.25)] = 47,122 
 
• Original Multiride Demand: 5,000 
• Original Multiride Per-Trip Price: $2.00 
• New Multiride Per-Trip Price: $3.50 
• Multiride Price Elasticity: -0.30 
 
New Multiride Demand (Price Effect), Mp = 5,000 ×  [($3.50 / $2.00)(-0.3)] = 4,227 
 
Total Demand = 8,700 + 47,122 + 4,227 = 60,049 
 
• % Change in Cash Price: $2.20 to $3.50: 59% 
• % Change in Pass Price: $71 to $90: 27% 
• % Change in Multiride Per-Trip Price: $2.00 to $3.50: 75% 
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• Cash-Pass Diversion Factor: 0.05 
• Pass-Cash Diversion Factor: 0.00 
• Cash-Multiride Diversion Factor: 0.00 
• Multiride-Cash Diversion Factor: 0.25 
 






20.2$/50.3$ = 111 
 






00.2$/50.3$ = 106 
 
New Cash Demand = Cp – Diverted Riders from Cash to Pass 
+ Diverted Riders from Multiride to Cash = 8,695 
 
New Pass Demand = Pp + Diverted Riders from Cash to Pass = 47,233 
 
New Multiride Demand = Mp – Diverted Riders from Multiride to Cash = 4,121 
 
Total Demand = 8,695 + 47,233 + 4,121 = 60,049 
 
Note that as each additional ridership diversion factor is introduced, and more and more 
cells in the spreadsheet become linked, the complexity of the spreadsheet model 
increases significantly.  However, the basic methodology explained above with regard to 
price elasticities and ridership diversion factors remains the same. 
 
 
PRICE ELASTICITY ESTIMATION 
 
The price elasticities used in the spreadsheet model are based in part on the MBTA’s own 
past experiences as well as a survey of the elasticities being used in the models of peer 
agencies.  In previous exercises to forecast the effect of price changes on ridership and 
revenue, the MBTA has generally done a good job at accurately projecting changes at the 
systemwide level.  The elasticity model has been less accurate, however, with regard to 
projecting the specific impacts on various modes and passenger categories. 
 
It is admittedly difficult to isolate the effects of price elasticity alone on changes in 
demand.  Over the course of a year (in which time it is assumed the effects of price 
changes are largely internalized by the population), economic, demographic, and other 
factors may play as much, if not more of, a role in influencing transit demand than price.  
With these caveats, it is possible, however, to compare ridership in the year before and 
the year after the previous fare increase, in January 2004, to arrive at some estimation of 
price elasticity.3 
 
                                     
3 Note that pass prices did not increase until February 2004. 
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Observed Price Elasticities of the MBTA and Peer Transit Agencies 
 
Observed Elasticity of the 2004 MBTA Fare Increase 
 
The first step of any elasticity estimation methodology is to compute the true demand 
before and after the price change.  The most accurate estimate of MBTA ridership comes 
from fare-mix studies.  However, the dates of the two previous studies – 2002 and 2005 – 
are too far apart to provide an accurate representation of ridership changes due only to 
the January 2004 price increase.  Given that monthly revenue information is more readily 
available and generally more reliable than ridership estimates, it is possible to use 
revenue as a proxy for ridership.  With regard to cash transactions, the MBTA records 
monthly cash revenues for all rapid transit and surface modes.  Ridership is assumed to 
equal the 2003 and 2004 revenue figures for each mode divided by the respective fare.  
For example, 2003 and 2004 bus cash revenue totaled $26.0 million and $28.5 million, 
respectively.  By dividing these two figures by the appropriate bus cash fare – $0.75 in 
2003 and $0.90 in 2004 – estimates of 34.7 million bus cash riders in 2003 and 31.6 
million bus cash riders in 2004 are obtained.  While revenue increased due to the fare 
increase, ridership is estimated to have decreased.  True average fare and pass values can 
also be used in place of nominal prices (the actual dollar value of fares) to estimate 
ridership. 
 
Price elasticity equals the ratio of the percent change in demand to the percent change in 
price.  In the example of bus cash ridership explained above, the percent change in 
demand (as measured by ridership) equals -9%, while the percent change in price (as 
measured by the fare) equals +20%.  The ratio of -9% to +20% gives a price elasticity 
estimate of -0.44.  In performing the same analysis for rapid transit cash demand, a price 
elasticity of -0.42 is obtained.  These numbers are significantly more elastic than those 
used in previous models. 
 
An estimation of pass elasticities presents some different conclusions.  While the combo 
pass has an elasticity of -0.32, the other major pass types all appear much more inelastic.  
The combo+ elasticity equals -0.15, while the bus pass elasticity equals -0.14.  The 
average commuter rail pass price elasticity is quite inelastic at -0.04.  Finally, due to an 
increase in the estimated demand for subway passes from 2003 to 2004, the subway pass 
price elasticity is actually positive.  It seems unreasonable to suggest, however, that the 
demand for subway passes should grow in response to a price increase (which is what a 
positive price elasticity means).  In order to arrive at a more realistic elasticity value for 
subway, we first note that the price elasticity for all core pass ridership categories (bus, 
subway, and combo) combined equals -0.09.  Next, the bus pass elasticity is -0.14, and 
bus boardings represent 32% of total bus + subway + combo pass ridership (the ratio of 
bus ridership plus one-half of combo ridership to the sum of all three categories).  If it 
were assumed that the subway pass elasticity represented the remaining 68% of this 
ridership, subway pass elasticity should be closer to -0.066 in order to lead to an average 
core pass price elasticity equal to -0.09.  This is admittedly an imperfect method of 
arriving at an estimate of elasticity; however, it does provide an estimate that is more 
realistic than a positive subway elasticity. 
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These results lead to some general conclusions regarding the appropriate price elasticities 
for the MBTA to use to forecast the ridership impact of fare changes.  First, it appears 
that a difference in price elasticities should continue to be used for the different payment 
categories of cash versus pass.  For instance, bus elasticity was estimated to be -0.44 for 
cash customers, while it was estimated at -0.14 for pass customers.  It is likely that a 
gradual shift in MBTA customers over the years from paying with cash to paying with 
passes (due to the convenience of paying for and with passes rather than any price effect) 
is responsible for some of this estimated difference.  Indeed, between the 1996 and 2005 
fare-mix studies, monthly pass ridership increased by 2.6%, while adult cash ridership 
decreased by 9.4%, indicating that some former cash customers may have switched to 
passes.  Nevertheless, setting a difference in price elasticities between cash and pass 
customers is appropriate. 
 
A second conclusion drawn from the analysis of historical demand and price changes is 
that price elasticities should differ between modes.  In both the pass and cash modal 
categories, bus ridership appears to be the most elastic, followed by subway, with 
commuter rail being quite inelastic.  Demographic patterns that have led to increases in 
commuter rail and subway ridership over the past decade, combined with bus ridership 
decreases, are likely contributors to these differences. 
 
Comparative Elasticities Used by Peer Transit Agencies 
 
A survey of the elasticities being used by peer transit agencies corroborates our 
conclusion that varying elasticities according to fare category is necessary to reach the 
most refined estimates of revenue and ridership changes.  NYCTA, the nation’s largest 
transit property with the greatest number of transit-dependent riders (and thus the most 
inelastic relationship between demand and price), uses price elasticities between -0.10 
and -0.15.  The fare model used by the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), which models a 
system much more comparable in terms of size and ridership to that of the MBTA, uses 
peak price elasticities that range from -0.41 for a transit card to -0.49 for a pass to -0.56 
for cash transactions.  Off-peak elasticities are even higher.  The model used by the 
Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) also employs a range of elasticities.  Pass elasticities 
range from -0.10 to -0.30, ticket elasticities range from -0.13 to -0.38, and cash 
elasticities range from -0.80 to -1.35.  
 
Data from peer agencies also seem to indicate that generally higher absolute values for 
elasticities are more appropriate than the MBTA has used in the past.  In the previous 
MBTA fare impacts analysis, cash elasticities that were used ranged from -0.12 to -0.17, 
and pass elasticities ranged from -0.17 to -0.21.  Various surveys have shown peak bus 
fare elasticities such as -0.32 in Spokane, Washington, and -0.21 in Los Angeles, with 
off-peak elasticities often twice as elastic.  Peak bus and metro (subway) elasticities in 
London are estimated to range between -0.20 and -0.30.  Summaries of public transport 
elasticities show short-run elasticities ranging from -0.20 to as high as -0.50, with even 
higher long-run estimates. 
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Description of Spreadsheet Elasticities 
 
The current MBTA spreadsheet model employs many of the elements used in the models 
of these peer agencies.  Four ranges of price elasticities are available for use in the 
spreadsheet model.  The “Low” range generally represents the level of elasticities that the 
MBTA has used in previous fare modeling exercises.  The “Mid” range decreases these 
elasticities by 0.10 (making them more elastic) and the “High” range decreases them 0.10 
further.  Finally, an “Extreme” range applies a price elasticity of -0.75 to most categories. 
 
Elasticities are divided between two payment categories: “Cash” (or pay-per-ride) and 
“Pass.”  “Cash” price elasticities are assumed to be 0.05 less than “Pass” elasticities, 
signifying that the spreadsheet model projects “Cash” customers to be slightly more 
responsive to price than “Pass” customers.  Elasticities are further divided into several 
modal categories: Bus, Subway, Combo (Bus plus Subway), Commuter Rail, Parking, 
Water, and THE RIDE.  All modes have both a “Cash” and “Pass” price elasticity except 
for THE RIDE, which applies only to “Cash” customers.  Generally, Bus elasticities are 
expected to be the most elastic, followed by Subway and Combo, then Commuter Rail 
and Water, THE RIDE, and, finally, Parking.  The Bus price elasticity is 0.05 less than 
the Subway and Combo price elasticity, which is itself 0.05 less than the price elasticity 
used for Commuter Rail and Water.  THE RIDE price elasticities are set at -0.05 and 
Parking price elasticities are set at -0.01 across all categories except that of “Extreme,” 
indicating that demand in both categories, despite the range, is quite inelastic.4 
 
The spreadsheet model uses the “Mid” range for price increases and the “High” range for 
price decreases.  These ranges of elasticities are higher than previous figures used by the 
MBTA, but seem to better conform with the observed elasticities from previous MBTA 
fare increases, as well as the surveys of peer transit agencies.  For example, a price 
elasticity of -0.30 for bus cash demand is slightly less elastic than the MBTA’s observed 
elasticity (-0.44); however, this “Mid” range value seems to be in line with the values 
being reported by peer transit agencies.5  The differences in elasticities between cash and 
pass and between modes also mirror the experiences of other agencies.  The potential 
ranges of cash and pass elasticities used in the spreadsheet model are shown in Table 1. 
 
Elasticity Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The price elasticities used in the spreadsheet ridership and revenue projection model are 
perhaps the key inputs to those projections.  Greater absolute numbers for elasticity (for 
example, 0.3 versus 0.2) will lead to a more dramatic response of riders to changes in 
price, which will have a corresponding impact on revenue.  As described above, the 
elasticities used in the spreadsheet model were arrived at through an analysis of past 
MBTA fare increases, the experiences of peer agencies, and literature about transit fare 
                                     
4 The notably low elasticity for parking is partly due to the fact that parking demand is currently greater 
than capacity at many park-and-ride lots throughout the region.  While higher parking prices may result in 
these facilities filling later than they currently do, it is likely that many would still fill up with the same 
number of customers. 
5 It should be noted that in the second-to-last fare increase, in 2000, the observed elasticity for the system 
as a whole was close to zero. 
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changes. This section demonstrates the extent to which the spreadsheet model is sensitive 
to various price elasticities. 
 
TABLE 1 
Potential Ranges of Cash and Pass Elasticities in the Spreadsheet Model 
 
  Low Mid High Extreme 
Cash Elasticities      
 Bus  -0.20 -0.30 -0.40 -0.75 
 Subway  -0.15 -0.25 -0.35 -0.75 
 Combo  -0.15 -0.25 -0.35 -0.75 
 Commuter Rail  -0.10 -0.20 -0.30 -0.75 
 Parking  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.25 
 Water  -0.10 -0.20 -0.30 -0.75 
 THE RIDE  -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.50 
       
Pass Elasticities      
 Bus  -0.15 -0.25 -0.35 -0.75 
 Subway  -0.10 -0.20 -0.30 -0.75 
 Combo  -0.10 -0.20 -0.30 -0.75 
 Commuter Rail  -0.05 -0.15 -0.25 -0.75 
 Parking  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.25 
 Water  -0.05 -0.15 -0.25 -0.75 
 
 
The general assumptions described above regarding elasticities and their relationships to 
each other are applied here.  Additionally, this sensitivity analysis assumes that the 
elasticities for price decreases will not be more than one level above those for price 
increases (i.e., if price increases receive the “Low” range of elasticities, price decreases 
cannot receive the “High” range).  Similarly, the level of elasticities for “Cash” 
customers can exceed those of “Pass” customers by no more than one level.  Four runs of 
the spreadsheet model were conducted to test its sensitivity to different ranges of 
elasticities (see Table 2). 
 
As seen in Table 3, the elasticity estimates used in the spreadsheet model can have a 
dramatic impact on the ridership and revenue projections.  Note that ridership is defined 
as the sum of linked trips, a total that includes transfers between modes or vehicles.  
These transfer trips are added to the linked trip total to attain unlinked trips.  The change 
in ridership differs by as much as 11.2 million from the first run to the fourth, which 
leads to differences in the revenue projections of as much as $16.2 million.  The elasticity 
levels chosen for the final spreadsheet model projections (“Mid” elasticities for price 
increases and “High” elasticities for price decreases) result in revenue and ridership 
projections that are between the two extremes, yet are still conservative in terms of 





Assumptions for Spreadsheet Model Sensitivity Analysis 
 
   Price Increase Price Decrease 
Sensitivity Run 1    
 Cash Elasticity  Low Mid 
 Pass Elasticity  Low Mid 
Sensitivity Run 2    
 Cash Elasticity  Mid High 
 Pass Elasticity  Low Mid 
Sensitivity Run 3    
 Cash Elasticity  Mid High 
 Pass Elasticity  Mid High 
Sensitivity Run 4    
 Cash Elasticity  High High 




Results of Sensitivity Analysis 
 
   Ridership 
(Linked Trips) 
Trips 
(Unlinked Trips) Revenue 
Sensitivity Run 1     
 Absolute Change  -9.6 million -8.8 million $82.0 million 
 Percent Change  -3.5% -2.7% 24.1% 
Sensitivity Run 2     
 Absolute Change  -13.6 million -12.8 million $75.8 million 
 Percent Change  -4.9% -4.0% 22.3% 
Sensitivity Run 3*     
 Absolute Change  -16.8 million -16.2 million $72.1 million 
 Percent Change  -6.1% -5.0% 21.2% 
Sensitivity Run 4     
 Absolute Change  -20.8 million -20.3 million $65.8 million 
 Percent Change  -7.5% -6.3% 19.3% 
*Sensitivity Analysis 3 (“Mid” elasticities for price increases and “High” elasticities for 




REVENUE AND RIDERSHIP IMPACTS 
 
Spreadsheet Model  
 
Information Sources and Modal Apportionment for Existing Ridership 
 
Existing ridership (to which price elasticity figures are applied) is estimated from several 
sources. The MBTA 2005 Fare-Mix Study provides total system ridership.  The Fare-Mix 
Study also breaks down total system ridership into the major modal categories (subway, 
surface light rail, bus, and commuter rail) as well as by the various types of payment 
(cash versus pass, adult, senior, student, etc.).  The spreadsheet model maintains these 
modal distinctions, but further divides them.  For instance, while the Fare-Mix Study 
reports total “bus” ridership, the spreadsheet model distinguishes local buses as well as 
local zoned routes and express routes under the “bus” category.  The ridership for the two 
latter subcategories is estimated separately using manual station-count data, which is then 
subtracted from the total “bus” ridership figure in the Fare-Mix Study, the remainder of 
which is set equal to local bus ridership.  The same is done for rapid transit, where the 
ridership for individual modal/fare categories, such as the Red Line South Shore branch 
and Braintree boardings, is calculated separately using ridecheck data and then subtracted 
from the total ridership associated with the “Red, Orange, Blue & Central Subway” 
category in the Fare-Mix Study. 
 
The two remaining modal categories in the Fare-Mix Study are the surface Green Line 
and commuter rail. With regard to the surface Green Line, ridership for each of the 
corresponding potential trip categories was calculated separately using manual station 
counts and then scaled to the aggregate number in the Fare-Mix Study.  Meanwhile, 
commuter rail zone-level and aggregate ridership data were both obtained from the Fare-
Mix Study.  Visitor Pass usage figures were also taken from the Fare-Mix Study and split 
among the 1-, 3-, and 7-day pass types. 
 
Many of the modal/fare categories in the spreadsheet model are not directly applicable to 
the ridership estimates in the Fare-Mix Study.  These include the Silver Line Waterfront 
and Washington Street, the Mattapan High-Speed Line, subway and commuter rail park-
and-ride customers, water transportation, and combo riders.  For each of these categories, 
ridership was determined separately and entered into the spreadsheet model. In the case 
of the Silver Line, ridership was based on the latest CTPS ridecheck information 
available, as was the case for the Mattapan High-Speed Line.  Park-and-ride trips were 
estimated using parking statistics for each station from the latest CTPS parking utilization 
inventory. Water transportation ridership was based on the latest fiscal year ridership 
counts.  Appropriate corrections were then made to ensure that these riders were not 
double-counted in multiple categories.  For example, the number of park-and-ride 
customers at Forest Hills Station was subtracted from the aggregate totals for all subway 
ridership. 
 
Combo riders were calculated separately based on assumptions about the number of 
passengers transferring between modes and were then subtracted from both of the 
corresponding single-ride categories that make up the combo trip (to avoid double-
counting).  For instance, the number of local bus-subway combo riders was estimated by 
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multiplying the total bus ridership from the Fare-Mix Study by the percent of bus riders 
reported to transfer to the subway in the latest MBTA Bus Passenger Survey.  This figure 
was then subtracted from the total bus ridership as well as total rapid transit ridership 
categories. 
 
As an example, assume that there are 100 reported bus riders, 125 reported subway 
riders, and 50 reported bus-subway combo riders.  In the spreadsheet model, the number 
of combo riders would equal 50, the number of bus-only riders would equal 100 minus 
50, or 50, and the number of subway-only riders would equal 125 minus 50, or 75.  The 
total ridership among these categories then amounts to 175 (50 + 75 + 50). 
 
As a slightly more complicated example, assume 100 reported subway riders, 75 reported 
commuter rail riders, 25 reported subway-commuter rail combo riders, 30 reported 
commuter rail park-and-ride riders, and 10 reported subway-commuter rail combo park-
and-ride riders.  The methodology used to apportion ridership to each of the modal 
categories is demonstrated below.  Since all of the subway-commuter rail combo park-
and-ride riders would also have been reported under the subway, commuter rail, subway-
commuter rail combo, and commuter rail park-and-ride categories, the 10 riders in this 
category should be subtracted from all the others.  Similarly, the remaining 20 commuter 
rail park-and-ride riders would also have been reported under the commuter rail category, 
so these 20 riders should be subtracted from the commuter rail category.  Finally, the 15 
remaining subway-commuter rail combo riders would also have been reported under the 
subway and commuter rail categories, thus necessitating their subtraction from these 
categories. 
 














Reported 10 30 25 75 100 
      
= 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 
 = 20  - 20  
  = 15 - 15 - 15 Actual 
   = 30 = 75 
Total Actual Ridership = 10 + 20 + 15 + 30 + 75 = 150 
 
 
Projected Changes in Core System Revenue and Ridership 
 
Projected changes in cash fare revenue and corresponding unlinked trips on the core 
system (rapid transit, Green Line, bus/trackless trolley) from the proposed fare increase 
and restructuring are shown in Table 4.  The impacts on customers paying with cash on 
board vehicles or using stored value on CharlieTickets are generally expected to be 
greater than those on customers using CharlieCards, given the surcharge placed on non-
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CharlieCard fares.  Particularly in the core system, where the step-up transfer discount is 
allowed only when fares are paid using a CharlieCard, customers paying by other means 
will be subject to the steepest fare increases.  As such, the number of customers using 
cash or CharlieTickets to pay for their ride is expected to decline the most dramatically.  
Surface Green Line customers will also experience a larger proportional fare increase due 
to the elimination of free outbound fares on all surface lines.  The impact of charging 
fares in the outbound direction is mitigated somewhat by the institution of one flat fare 
on all branches and the removal of distance-based fares on the D Branch. 
 
All monthly passes are valid on more than one mode, so pass ridership changes by mode 
are more difficult to calculate than cash-fare changes.  Changes in sales of any given pass 
form could reflect shifts to or from the use of other pass forms or cash fares rather than 
actual ridership gains or losses.  Most passengers obtaining monthly Bus, Subway, 
Combo, or Combo Plus passes use them mostly on core system service, but the latter 
three forms are also valid for travel between the downtown Boston commuter rail stations 
and stations in commuter rail Zones 1A or 1B.  The spreadsheet model does attempt to 
account for these shifts through the use of ridership diversion factors. 
 
TABLE 4 
Core System Cash/Stored Value Fare Revenue and Ridership 
Before and After Fare Increase and Restructuring 
 
  Annual Total Fare Revenue Annual Fare Rides (Unlinked Trips) 
Mode  Existing Projected % Chg. Existing Projected % Chg.
Rapid Transit and 
Central Subway 
 $75.8 m $96.1 m +26.8% 65.9 m 61.4 m -6.9%
Surface Green Line  11.6 m 17.1 m +47.7% 16.4 m 13.8 m -16.0%
Bus and Trackless 
Trolley 
 22.0 m 29.5 m +34.1% 48.2 m 44.5 m -7.8%
Total  $109.3 m $142.7 m +30.5% 130.5 m 119.6 m -8.4%
 
 
Projected changes in pass revenue and corresponding unlinked trips on the core system 
due to the proposed fare increase and restructuring are shown in Table 5.  Compared to 
single-ride customers paying with cash on board vehicles or using stored-value 
CharlieTickets, pass customers are expected to bear a smaller share of the burden of the 
fare increase.  As was stated earlier, the largest revenue impact is in the Surface Green 
Line category, due to the elimination of free outbound fares.  This is expected to lead 
many customers to switch from single-ride cash fares to passes.  Due to a smaller overall 
percentage increase in pass prices, a lesser impact on revenue and ridership was projected 
in the pass category.  Also lessening the revenue gains and ridership losses for passes in 
the core system is the introduction of the LinkPass, which will provide benefits 
equivalent to the previous Combo and Combo+ passes, at a lower price than currently 




Core System Monthly Pass Revenue and Ridership 
Before and After Fare Increase and Restructuring 
 
  Annual Total Pass Revenue Annual Pass Rides (Unlinked Trips) 
Mode  Existing Projected % Chg. Existing Projected % Chg.
Rapid Transit and 
Central Subway 
 $73.4 m $83.8 m +14.2% 89.5 m 87.4 m -2.4%
Surface Green Line  6.3 m 9.2 m +47.0% 13.9 m 12.8 m -8.4%
Bus and Trackless 
Trolley 
 28.5 m 29.7 m +4.2% 53.2 m 52.0 m -2.3%
Total  $108.1 m $122.6 m +13.5% 156.6 m 152.1 m -2.9%
 
 
Projected Changes in Non-Core System Revenue and Ridership 
 
Projected changes in cash fare revenue and unlinked trips outside of the core system 
(express bus, commuter rail, ferry services, and THE RIDE) from the proposed fare 
increase and restructuring are shown in Table 6. As was the case with the core system, 
the impacts on customers paying with cash are generally expected to be greater than for 
pass customers.  Unlike the core system, however, where surcharges result in a 
significant increase in price for customers paying with cash on-board vehicles or using 
CharlieTickets, the difference in impacts for express buses, commuter rail, and boats is 
due mainly to the relative increase in cash and pass prices.  This is because the 
installation of automated fare-collection (AFC) technology is not scheduled to occur for 
these modes with the exception of express buses by the time the fare increase and 
restructuring would take effect. 
 
Commuter rail contributes the bulk of the ridership and revenue outside of the core 
system.  The percentage increase in single-ride cash prices is slightly less than in the 
core, and this is one of the reasons for the smaller percentage increase in commuter rail 
fare revenue.  However, the ridership loss for commuter rail is also projected to be less 
than in the core, due in part to its smaller percentage fare increase but also to the 
spreadsheet model’s assumption of smaller elasticities for commuter rail customers.  
Ridership and revenue for express bus and ferry service are projected to remain relatively 
consistent, since the fares for these modes were either unchanged (in the case of 
commuter boats) or restructured (in the case of express buses and inner-harbor ferries).  
This restructuring was designed to provide simpler pricing and to result in smaller overall 
fare increases.  
 
Projected changes in pass revenue and unlinked trips outside the core system as a result 
of the proposed fare increase and restructuring are shown in Table 7.  As was the case 
with the core system, the smaller percentage price increases in commuter rail passes 
compared to cash fares leads to a smaller revenue gain and less ridership loss.  The 
effective lowering of pass prices for some express bus customers and inner-harbor ferry 





Non-Core System Cash/Stored Value Fare Revenue and Ridership 
Before and After Fare Increase and Restructuring 
 
  Annual Total Fare Revenue Annual Fare Rides (Unlinked Trips) 
Mode  Existing Projected % Chg. Existing Projected % Chg.
Express Bus  $  1.6 m $  1.7 m +2.9% 1.0 m 1.0 m +0.8%
Commuter Rail  42.7 m 52.4 m +22.8% 9.9 m 9.5 m -3.6%
Ferry Services  4.9 m 5.0 m +0.6% 1.0 m 1.0 m -0.9%
THE RIDE  2.4 m 2.7 m +10.0% 1.3 m 1.3 m -0.7%




Non-Core System Pass Revenue and Ridership 
Before and After Fare Increase and Restructuring 
 
  Annual Total Pass Revenue Annual Pass Rides (Unlinked Trips) 
Mode  Existing Projected % Chg. Existing Projected % Chg.
Express Bus  $1.0 m $0.9 m -12.8% 0.8 m 0.9 m +11.9%
Commuter Rail  $67.9 m $82.1 m +20.9% 19.9 m 19.5 m -2.4%
Ferry Services  $0.9 m $0.9 m -1.1% 0.2 m 0.2 m +3.2%
Total  $80.2 m $96.5 m +20.1% 21.0 m 20.6 m -1.8%
 
 
Travel Demand Model  
 
Projected Changes in System Revenue and Ridership 
 
The changes in systemwide cash fare and pass revenue and unlinked trips from the 
proposed fare increase and restructuring, as projected using the travel demand model, are 
shown in Table 8.  Aside from commuter rail, the change in unlinked trips projected by 
the travel demand model for all modes is quite modest.  Trips on bus and ferry were 
actually projected to increase under the fare increase and restructuring scenario. Revenue 
is projected to increase by 18.4% systemwide. 
 
Comparison of Spreadsheet and Travel Demand Models  
 
Although the spreadsheet and travel demand models use two different methods to arrive 
at their forecasts for ridership and revenue, the numbers generated by each are justifiable.  
Indeed, differences between the models’ results – so long as they are not extreme – may 





System Fare and Pass Revenue and Ridership 
Before and After Fare Increase and Restructuring 
 




Mode Existing Projected % Chg. Existing Projected % Chg.
Rapid Transit 265.3 m 260.2 m -1.9%
Bus and Trackless 
Trolley 104.5 m 107.7 m +3.1%
Commuter Rail 32.3 m 27.1 m -16.1%
Express Bus 11.7 m 11.8 m 0.7%
Ferry 0.2 m 0.1 m -8.6%
Total $368.8 m $436.9 m +18.4% 414.0 m 406.9 m -1.7%
 
 
Table 9 presents the ridership and revenue estimates of both models under the existing 
conditions as well as the projected fare increase and restructuring scenario.  The table 
compares the absolute numbers generated by the models as well as the percentage 
changes expected for each measure. 
 
Projected Changes in Revenue and Ridership 
 
The two models’ estimations of linked trips under existing conditions are close to one 
another, with slight differences resulting from the methodologies associated with each.  
As described earlier, the spreadsheet tool estimates ridership based on recent MBTA 
revenue reports and specific average fare factors for each mode.  The travel demand 
model is calibrated to represent existing ridership as close to revenue-based ridership 
estimations as possible, but also must take into account the relative proportions of trips 
made regionwide via transit and other modes, in accordance with household survey, U.S. 
Census, and other demographic data.  The two forecasting tools also use different 
approaches to estimating current fare revenue, with the spreadsheet model’s estimates 
based on the most recent MBTA revenue collection reports and the travel demand model 
deriving revenue from average fare factors applied to estimated ridership. 
 
While the difference between the models’ estimates for linked trips lies below 5.0%, the 
two estimates for unlinked trips differ by 22.2%.  There are several likely reasons for this 
difference.  First, the travel demand model, unlike the spreadsheet model, includes 
ridership for non-MBTA regional transit agencies.  Many of these trips, and particularly 
those that are oriented towards Boston commuting, likely necessitate a transfer upon 
arrival to or departure from Boston, thus inflating the unlinked trip total for the regional 
travel demand model.  A second reason for the higher estimate of transfers (1.42 transfers 
per linked trip for the travel demand model versus 1.16 for the spreadsheet model) lies 
with the travel demand model’s assumption of unconstrained parking.  Removing parking 
capacity as a constraint to trip decisions helps to more clearly elicit the effect of prices on 
travel demand; however, this also results in many more park-and-ride trips from less-
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costly commuter rail stations that are close to the urban core than from the relatively 
more expensive parking lots at rapid transit stations.  Since commuter rail riders are more 
likely to transfer to another mode as part of their trip, this assumption further increases 
the travel demand model’s estimate of unlinked trips. 
 
Notable differences are also shown in the percentage changes projected by the two 
forecasting tools for both ridership and revenue.  In particular, the spreadsheet model 
projects that the fare changes will result in a greater ridership loss – 5.0% for unlinked 
trips and 6.1% for linked trips.  The travel demand model estimates losses of 1.7% and 
2.8%, respectively.  This effect is likely due in part to the multimodal scope of the travel 
demand model and its assumption that all trips currently made in the region (regardless of 
mode – auto, transit, walking, etc.) will continue to be made after a fare change. 
 
Whereas the travel demand model starts with a set number of trips and then distributes 
these trips to various modes such as driving or transit, thus conserving the total number 
of trips in the region, the spreadsheet model only considers transit trips and the cost of 
those trips in isolation.  It does not consider the relative costs of driving versus transit.  
For any given price increase in the spreadsheet model, the use of price elasticities will 
lead to a percentage decrease in demand, regardless of whether it may or may not be truly 
feasible for someone to switch from transit to driving, for example.  On the other hand, 
the travel demand model’s conservation of the total number of trips does not account for 
the overall decrease in travel that would be expected to realistically occur when the price 
for that travel increases.  This conservation in effect lowers the sensitivity of transit riders 
with respect to the overall price of transit, which is the likely reason for the lower 
percentage changes projected by the travel demand model compared to the spreadsheet 
model.  However, given the uncertainty associated with forecasting demand, the two 
models provide what could be considered a reasonable range of estimates for the impact 
on ridership of the price increase and restructuring. 
 
Estimates of revenue changes range from 18.4% for the travel demand model to 21.2% 
for the spreadsheet model.  This result is somewhat counterintuitive, given that the 
ridership decrease projected by the spreadsheet model is much greater.  However, as 
noted above, the travel demand model projects a substantially greater loss in commuter 
rail ridership than the spreadsheet model.  Since commuter rail riders pay much higher 
fares, on average, than rapid transit or bus riders, and since they use park-and-ride 
facilities at a higher rate than bus and rapid transit users, their contribution to the travel 
demand model’s projected revenue loss is substantial.  
 
Overall, the results of the spreadsheet and travel demand models appear to fall within a 
reasonable range of variability.  In terms of absolute figures, the range of the projected 
revenue increase as a result of the proposed fare changes and restructuring is between 
approximately $68 million and $72 million per year, and passenger boardings are 
projected to decrease by 7.1 million to 16.1 million per year, or approximately 24,500 to 
55,500 per typical weekday.  What differences there are in these ranges can be explained 
in large part by certain assumptions used for each model with regard to elasticities, trip 
conservation, and transfer activity.
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TABLE 9 
Comparison of System Revenue and Ridership 
Before and After Fare Increase and Restructuring 
 


















Linked Trips  290.9 m 276.7 m -4.9% 282.9 m 260.0 m -8.1% -2.8% -6.1% 
Unlinked Trips  414.0 m 322.1 m -22.2% 406.9 m 306.0 m -24.8% -1.7% -5.0% 
Transfers per 
Linked Trip 
 1.42        
        
        
1.16 -18.2% 1.44 1.18 -18.2% +1.1% +1.1%
Fare Revenue  $368.8 m $340.3 m -7.7% $436.9 m $412.4 m -5.6% +18.4% +21.2% 
Fare Revenue per 
Linked Trip 
 $1.27 $1.23 -3.0% $1.54 $1.59 +2.7% +21.8% +29.0%
Fare Revenue per 
Unlinked Trip 
 $0.89 $1.06 +18.6% $1.07 $1.35 +25.6% +20.5% +27.6%
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AIR QUALITY IMPACTS 
 
 The air quality impacts of alternative transportation scenarios can be analyzed using 
standard traffic forecasting models, including the one maintained by the Boston Region 
MPO.  These models can be used to estimate future traffic volumes, average highway 
speeds, vehicle miles, and vehicle hours traveled within the transportation network at a 
highly disaggregate level.  Since the amount of air pollution emitted by highway traffic 
depends on the prevailing highway speeds and vehicle miles traveled, it is possible to 
estimate these air quality impacts with reasonable accuracy. 
 
 Air pollutants produced by highway traffic generally fall into two groups:  gaseous 
and particulate pollutants.  Examples of gaseous pollutants include carbon monoxide 
(CO), unburned hydrocarbons (HC), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and sulfur oxides (SOx).  In 
addition, photochemical oxidants are not directly emitted from vehicles but are formed 
when HC and NOx chemically react in the presence of sunlight and warm temperatures.  
Particulate pollutants include carbon particles and lead compounds.  In the case of 
Boston, which is in attainment for particulate emissions, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) is primarily interested in the gaseous pollutants produced by 
the transportation sector.  More particularly, the EPA requires that planning agencies 
report the amount of CO, NOx, and VOC (volatile organic compounds) produced by the 
transportation system in such documents as the Transportation Improvement Program 
and the Regional Transportation Plan.   
 
 CTPS employs EPA MOBILE 6.2 emission factors6 for calculating the pollutants.  
For each link within the highway network, the travel demand model applies the MOBILE 
6.2 emission factors corresponding to the link’s average speed and estimates the 
pollutants based on the vehicle miles traveled on that link.  The amount of total pollutants 
for the entire region is obtained by summing all the pollutants associated with each link 
in the system. 
 
Results of the Travel Demand Model Application 
 
 With respect to the proposed fare increase and restructuring, the air quality impacts 
are primarily those associated with existing transit users choosing to drive to their 
destinations instead of using transit.  These additional automobile trips generate 
pollutants that can be measured in kilograms of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and 
volatile organic compounds, as discussed in the previous paragraph.  It should be noted 
as well that as the number of automobile trips increases, so does congestion on area 
roadways.  This additional congestion results in lower travel speeds for all automobiles – 
not just those of former transit users. 
 
 After the ridership impacts of the fare increase and restructuring were calculated as 
described in the first section of this memo, the Boston regional travel demand model was 
used to estimate the change in regional automobile vehicle miles and vehicle hours 
traveled.  Specifically, the travel demand model identifies the path of each automobile 
trip made by former transit users and also estimates the travel times for all automobile 
                                     
6 Kilograms of pollutant per vehicle mile traveled. 
26 
trips.  These data were applied to emission factors provided by the EPA that are 
associated with each of the three pollutants identified above.  As shown in Table 10, the 
projected regional increase in each of these pollutants is below 0.3%.  Any loss in transit 
ridership that results in a gain in vehicle miles and hours traveled will lead to an increase 
in pollutants.  However, given that the margin of error associated with the model is likely 
larger than the estimated increase, the actual change could be negligible. 
 
TABLE 10 
Projected Weekday Increases in Selected Pollutants (Regionwide) 
 
Indicator  Absolute Increase Percent Increase
Vehicle Miles Traveled  252,484 0.212%
Vehicle Hours Traveled  14,553 0.389%
Carbon Monoxide  4,026 kg 0.213%
Nitrogen Oxides  475 kg 0.219%
Volatile Organic Compounds  226 kg 0.274%
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IMPACTS 
 
Definition of Environmental Justice Neighborhoods 
 
To assess the impacts of the potential 2007 fare increase and restructuring on minority 
and low-income communities, an environmental justice impacts analysis was undertaken.  
Environmental justice neighborhoods were identified based on a methodology developed 
from Federal Transit Administration guidance to the MBTA’s ongoing Title VI program 
and past practice of the Boston Region MPO.  First, the income levels and percentages of 
minority populations in all traffic analysis zones (TAZs) in the region were identified.  
Low-income TAZs were then defined as areas with income levels at or below 75% of the 
MBTA service area median household income ($41,850).  Minority TAZs are those in 
which the non-white or Hispanic population is greater than the average for the MBTA 
service area (approximately 20%).  Any TAZ which qualifies as either minority or low-
income is considered an environmental justice community. 
  
Equity Determination of Proposed Fares 
 
After identifying the minority and low-income communities, the equity of the system’s 
fare structure and levels was assessed, in terms of both the existing and proposed 
conditions, using the Boston Region MPO’s regional travel demand model.  Under the 
current fare structure, the average fare for low-income TAZs is estimated to be $1.15, 
which is $0.04 below the systemwide average7 of $1.19.  The estimated average fare for 
minority TAZs is lower, at $1.11.  Under the proposed fare increase and restructuring, the 
                                     
7 “Systemwide” refers to the entire modeled area of the regional travel demand model, which encompasses 
the entire bus, rapid transit, and commuter rail networks. 
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average fares for low-income and minority TAZs are estimated to be $1.43 and $1.38, 
respectively, while the systemwide average is estimated to be $1.46.  Table 11 compares 




Existing and Proposed Average Fares for Environmental Justice TAZs 
 
 Existing Average Fare Proposed Average Fare 
Low-income TAZs $1.15 $1.43 
Minority TAZs 1.11 1.38 
Systemwide Average 1.19 1.46 
 
 
Table 11 indicates that the proposed fare structure and fare levels, as well as the current 
structure and prices, do not place a disproportionate burden on environmental justice 
communities.  Indeed, low-income and minority TAZs pay lower average fares than the 
systemwide average.  In moving from the existing to the proposed fare structure, as 
shown by Table 12, the difference between the monetary increase in average fares paid 
by low-income and minority TAZs and the systemwide average is less than $0.012.  
Since these differences are approximately equal for each of the three categories shown in 
Table 12, the proposed fare structure maintains lower fares on average for environmental 
justice communities.  Note that pass users typically pay lower average fares than 
customers who pay for one ride at a time.  This benefits the MBTA’s most committed 
ridership and those who are transit-dependent. 
 
TABLE 12 
Projected Absolute Changes in Fares for Low-Income and Minority TAZs 
 
 $ Change in Fare 
Low-income TAZs +$0.281 
Minority TAZs +$0.273 
Systemwide Average +$0.269 
 
 
Comparative Percentage Changes in Average Fare 
 
While the proposed fare structure clearly does not place a disproportionate burden on 
environmental justice communities, as described above, one may note that when the 
absolute price changes shown in Table 12 are converted to percentage changes, minority 
and low-income neighborhoods appear to experience slightly higher impacts than the 
system as a whole.  The systemwide increase in revenue per trip projected by the travel 
demand model equals 22.5%, while the percentage change estimated for low-income 
TAZs is 24.4% and for minority TAZs is 24.7%.  However, these differences should be 
understood with two qualifications.   
 
First, since the existing average fare for environmental justice communities is lower than 
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the systemwide average, the nearly equal absolute price increases shown in Table 12 will 
affect these environmental justice communities relatively more on a percentage basis.  
Second, even though the regional travel demand model has no defined margin of error, it 
is reasonable to assume that such differences, or at least part of such differences, may lie 
within the inevitable error of a model trying to predict human behavior.  This margin of 
error applies as much to the average fare values shown in Tables 11 and 12 as to the 
differences in the percentage changes.   
 
In an effort to better understand the cause of this difference in percentage changes, 
several attempts were made to reduce or eliminate them by modeling variations on the 
proposed fare structure.  None of these attempts was entirely successful, either alone or in 
combination, at eliminating them; however, each did have the effect of lowering the 
absolute changes in average fares for environmental justice communities, and therefore, 
the percentage changes as well.  Reducing rapid transit prices from the original proposal, 
for example, did reduce the percentage differences slightly.  This is because there is a 
greater proportion of environmental justice TAZs than systemwide TAZs within a one-
mile radius of rapid transit stations.  Thus any decrease in rapid transit prices will affect 
environmental justice communities relatively more than the system, thereby reducing, but 
not eliminating, the difference between their estimated percentage change in average fare 
and that of the system as whole. 
 
The inability of price adjustments to totally eliminate the modeled differences in 
percentage increases suggests that the proposed structural changes to fare payment 
categories, irrespective of any price increases, may be contributing factors.  It should be 
noted that several aspects of the proposed fare structure were incorporated to promote 
equity upon recommendations of the MBTA Rider Oversight Committee.  These new 
features actually appear to result in relatively higher percentage price changes for 
environmental justice communities, according to the model.  The step-up transfer, for 
example, was intended by the Rider Oversight Committee to eliminate the perceived 
penalty faced by riders who live beyond a reasonable walking distance to rapid transit 
and must therefore transfer between bus and rapid transit.  Under the current fare 
structure, these residents pay a bus fare plus a rapid transit fare, for a total of $2.15, when 
transferring.  The step-up transfer will lower the cost of this trip to $1.70, undoubtedly 
benefiting many transit-dependent low-income and minority residents, especially those in 
sections of Dorchester (such as the Grove Hall and Four Corners neighborhoods) and all 
of the City of Chelsea, who tend to transfer between bus and rapid transit.   
 
However, the regional travel demand model projections suggest that this transfer 
privilege would actually benefit non-low income and non-minority communities more 
(since a greater proportion of non-environmental justice TAZs lie outside the radius of 
rapid transit stations that is considered to be a reasonable walking distance by the model).  
In addition, the elimination of premium fare zones on the rapid transit system in Newton, 
Quincy, and Braintree was intended by the Rider Oversight Committee to simplify the 
fare structure and make it easier to understand.  However, the model projects that this 
simplification would provide greater benefits to residents of non-low income and non-
minority TAZs, thus lowering the systemwide average percentage increase in comparison 
to that of environmental justice TAZs. 
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While these efforts to explore various adjustments to the proposed fare structure are 
instructive, no changes are ultimately necessary in the context of environmental justice or 
Title VI considerations.  First, the results shown above in Tables 11 and 12 clearly 
indicate that environmental justice communities will continue to pay average fares that 
are less than the systemwide average, even after the implementation of the proposed fare 
increase and restructuring.  Second, each of the potential adjustments suggested above is 
inconsistent with the intent of the proposed structural changes to create a simpler and 
fairer pricing system.  In particular, the proposed step-up transfer responds to the legal 
mandate included in the MBTA enabling legislation to provide free or substantially 
reduced transfers between bus and rapid transit.  This was a key component of the 
MBTA’s discussions regarding the fare structure with the Rider Oversight Committee, 
whose participation and recommendations consistently emphasized a concern for equity.  
Per those recommendations, a single fare of $1.70 will now allow one to travel from one 
end of the core network to the other on any combination of bus or rapid transit routes: 
one trip equals one fare.  
 
 
SERVICE REDUCTIONS IN LIEU OF A FARE INCREASE 
 
Earlier this year, MBTA Service Planning was asked to identify a list of service 
reductions that could be implemented in the event that the potential 2007 fare increase 
and restructuring are not approved.  While these reductions would not generate nearly the 
level of cost savings necessary to fully offset the loss of new revenue, they represent to 
MBTA Operations the maximum cuts that could be tolerated without a substantial 
degradation in regional transit mobility.  
 
Potential service reductions were divided into the following seven categories: 
• Eliminate 20 highest net-cost-per-passenger bus routes; 
• Reduce weekend light rail, heavy rail and bus service by 50%; 
• Reduce weekday evening light rail, heavy rail, and bus service by 50%; 
• Stretch weekday subway headways for a savings of $2.8 million; 
• Reduce weekday evening, Saturday, and Sunday commuter rail service by 50%; 
• Eliminate RIDE van service to Framingham, Natick, Concord, Nahant, Beverly, 
Wenham, Danvers, Middleton, and Topsfield; and 
• Eliminate the Suburban Transportation Program. 
 
These reductions would result in a total projected savings of $57 million and an annual 
ridership loss of 18 million (see Table 13). 
 
Elimination of 20 Least Cost-Effective Bus Routes  
 
This category of service reductions would completely eliminate service on the 20 least 
cost-effective bus routes in the system.  The impacts would be most acute in North Shore 
communities, which would see the elimination of seven bus routes. More specifically, all 
bus service to Peabody, Danvers, and large portions of Salem and Lynn would no longer 
operate.  Also under this scenario, Newton Centre and Newton’s Oak Hill neighborhood 
would be left without bus service, and certain local bus routes in Jamaica Plain and 
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Quincy, which primarily serve as circulator routes for senior citizens and students, would 
also be eliminated. Local route service to parts of Cambridge, Arlington, and Lexington 
would be discontinued. Express bus service from parts of Waltham, Woburn, and 
Medford to Boston would be discontinued. Early morning service from Roxbury and 
Dorchester, which brings residents to jobs at Logan Airport, would be discontinued. Bus 
service connecting North Station to the South Boston waterfront would also end. 
 
Table 13 details the potential savings from each of these bus routes, as well as the 
number of riders that would likely be lost.  
 
50% Reduction in Weekend Rapid Transit and Bus Service 
 
The next category of service cuts analyzed in the event that a fare increase is not 
approved is a 50% reduction in weekend rapid transit and bus service.  This would result 
in a significant increase in average waiting time for the Red, Green, Orange, and Blue 
lines on Saturdays and Sundays.  For example, on the Red Line Braintree Branch on 
Sundays, the current service frequency of every 14 minutes would be stretched to nearly 
21 minutes.  Waiting times for bus service would vary greatly by route; however, many 
routes would have service frequencies worse than one bus per hour if weekend service is 
reduced 50% across the board.  
 
A 50% reduction in Saturday bus service is expected to result in a loss of 35,000 riders 
per Saturday, or 26% of all Saturday bus riders. A 50% reduction in Sunday bus service 
is expected to result in a loss of 34,000 riders per Sunday, or 32% of all Sunday bus 
riders.  
 
A 50% reduction in Saturday rapid transit service is expected to result in a loss of 58,300 
riders per Saturday, or 20% of all Saturday rapid transit riders. A 50% reduction in 
Sunday rapid transit service is expected to result in a loss of 47,500 riders per Sunday, or 
20% of all Sunday rapid transit riders. 
 
50% Reduction in Weekday Rapid Transit and Bus Service After 9:00 PM 
 
In addition to the potential reductions in weekend service, the analysis also includes 
reducing service by 50% on weekdays after 9:00 PM.  Again, this would result in a 
significant amount of time between scheduled trips on the Red, Orange, Blue, and Green 
lines.  For example, on the Orange Line during late weekday evening hours, the current 
service frequency of every 15 minutes would be stretched to over 20 minutes. 
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TABLE 13 
















4 North Station-World 
Trade Ctr. 
 
$1,510 271 $14.97 67,479 $1,335,371
48 Centre & Eliot Sts.-
JP Loop 
 








4,365 626 6.02 155,874 938,361
78 Arlmont-Harvard  6,073 1,135 4.47 282,615 1,263,289








2,026 407 4.38 101,343 443,882




1,581 180 6.91 44,820 309,706
354 Woburn-Boston  5,574 802 4.10 199,698 818,762
435 Liberty Tree Mall-
Central Sq. Lynn 
 
3,348 536 5.65 133,464 754,072
436 Liberty Tree Mall-
Central Sq. Lynn 
 
3,705 686 4.80 170,814 819,907
439 Nahant-Central Sq. 
Lynn 
 






1,965 257 4.79 63,933 306,748
451 North Beverly-Salem 
Depot 
 
1,843 227 7.52 56,523 425,053
456 Salem Depot-Central 
Sq. Lynn 
 
805 100 4.63 24,900 115,287
465 Liberty Tree Mall-
Salem Depot 
 
1,820 290 5.68 72,210 410,153
468 Danvers Sq.-Salem 
Depot 
 
179 17 9.93 4,233 42,034
505 Cent. Sq., Waltham- 
Downtown Boston 
 







A 50% reduction in rapid transit service after 9:00 PM on weekdays would result in an 
overall loss of 20.5% of the riders who have been traveling at those times.  In absolute 
terms, this would be about 8,400 riders per weekday. 
 
Stretch Weekday Rapid Transit Headways 
 
Lengthening peak headways by removing one train set from each time period before 9:00 
PM on weekdays is projected to result in a ridership loss of about 3%. This equates to 
about 14,000 riders per weekday.  
 
50% Reduction in Commuter Rail Service on Weekdays After 9:00 PM and on 
Weekends 
 
In conjunction with the bus and rapid transit service cuts described above, the analysis 
includes even more substantial cuts in commuter rail service, should the 2007 fare 
increase not be approved.  In particular, half of all commuter rail trips on weekdays after 
9:00 PM and half of all weekend trips would be eliminated.  On most lines, this would 
result in only one outbound trip operating from Boston after 9:00 PM on weekdays, and 
the typical two-hour frequency for weekend service would be stretched to four hours.  At 
the extreme, stations along the Fitchburg Line beyond South Acton Station, and the entire 
Haverhill/Reading Line, would be left with only two to three trips on Saturday and 
Sunday. 
 
A 50% reduction in commuter rail service after 9:00 PM on weekdays would result in an 
overall loss of 32.5% of the riders who have been traveling at those times. In absolute 
terms, this equates to about 890 riders per weekday. A 50% reduction in commuter rail 
weekend service would be expected to reduce weekend ridership by around 33%. This 
would be a loss of about 9,300 riders per Saturday and 5,100 per Sunday. 
 
Elimination of THE RIDE Service in Natick, Framingham, Concord, Nahant, 
Beverly, Wenham, Danvers, Middleton, and Topsfield 
 
THE RIDE service in Natick, Framingham, Concord, Nahant, Beverly, Wenham, 
Danvers, Middleton, and Topsfield would be eliminated.  Since there is no local transit 
service directly operated by the MBTA in Natick, Framingham, Concord, Wenham, 
Middleton, and Topsfield, and since directly operated service in Nahant, Beverly, and 
Danvers would be eliminated because those routes are among the 20 worst-performing 
bus routes, the MBTA would not be legally obligated to operate THE RIDE service there. 
 
Elimination of Suburban Transportation Program 
 
The Suburban Transportation Program, which provides partial funding for local 
municipal bus services in Beverly, Bedford, Burlington, Framingham, Natick, Dedham, 
and Needham, as well as the Mission Hill Link bus, would be discontinued.  Participating 
communities would be obligated to obtain additional funding from other sources or 
discontinue these local circulator and commuter rail feeder bus services.  The total annual 




Projected Revenue and Ridership Impacts of Service Reduction Scenarios 
 





Eliminate 20 highest net-cost-
per passenger bus routes $10.1 1,948,116 
Reduce weekend light rail, 
heavy rail, and bus service by 
50% 
23.0 9,089,600 
Reduce weekday evening light 
rail, heavy rail, and bus service 
by 50% 
4.2 2,091,600 
Stretch weekday subway 
headways 2.8 3,486,000 
Reduce weekday evening, 
Saturday, and Sunday commuter 
rail service by 50% 
11.8 970,410 
Eliminate RIDE van service to 9 
communities 1.5 68,930 
Eliminate the Suburban 
Transportation Program 0.5 400,000 
Total $53.9 18,054,656 
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